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INTRODUCTION

Copyright lawsuits are ubiquitous in the age of Napster2 and its progeny.3 It
almost seems as though everyone is either a victim or an aggressor in this war
between the protection of ideas and the propagation of ideas. Plaintiffs are wellknown to love deep pockets, but whose pockets can they reach? Copyright law
provides two causes of action for imposing secondary liability on parties indirectly
involved in infringing activities.4 Those who materially aid, induce, or cause
copyright infringement by another may be held liable for contributory infringement
1
2009 Juris Doctor candidate, Pepperdine University School of Law. Received the Janet E. Kerr
Achievement Award for authoring this case note.
2
Napster, the popular Internet music file-sharing service, brought mainstream attention to online
file-sharing before it was eventually brought to court. See Napster, infra notes 120-125 and
accompanying text.
3
Those who keep up with the news are probably most aware of the RIAA (Recording Industry
Association of America), an organization of music artists and publishers which gained recent notoriety
as a highly litigious anti-piracy group.
4
See infra Part II, D and E, notes 60-136 and accompanying text.
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of copyright.5 Those who profit from the infringement of another while possessing
the power to stop or limit the infringer’s activities may be held liable for vicarious
infringement of copyright.6 Both forms of secondary liability have persisted
through history, subtly adapting to a moving target: infringement aided by
increasingly newer technology.7 Recent cases have already applied secondary
copyright liability to piracy over the Internet;8 and now, the Ninth Circuit has
addressed the issue of online piracy funding.9
In Perfect 10 v. Visa, adult entertainment publisher Perfect 10 ran an Internet
website distributing copyrighted photos to paid subscribers.10 Other websites
copied these photos without permission and offered the material for sale online.11
Payment processing for these sales was handled by Visa and other defendants.12
Perfect 10 notified the defendants of this infringing activity and requested that the
offending sites be denied payment processing services.13 The defendants did not
comply and Perfect 10 brought action for secondary copyright liability, among
other claims.14 The trial court’s dismissal was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals, which held that Perfect 10 could not establish claims for contributory
or vicarious infringement of copyright.15 In short, Visa escaped liability because it
was not directly involved in the distribution or advertisement of the infringing
materials; rather, it was only involved in financial transactions connected to the
infringement.16
In this environment where every copyright holder seems to be looking for
someone to sue, Perfect 10 represents a major windfall for credit card companies.
While financial processors operating on the Internet have fewer obligations than
other online service providers, copyright holders are now denied a major avenue in
enforcing their intellectual property interests.
This case note discusses the origins, reasoning, and impact of the Perfect 10
decision. It argues that the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of Perfect 10 was based on
flawed reasoning and misapplication of precedent, thereby creating an erroneous
decision inconsistent with the law. Part II summarizes United States copyright
law, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, contributory copyright infringement,
and vicarious copyright infringement.17 Part III describes the relevant facts of
Perfect 10 as well as its technological and economic contexts.18 Part IV examines
the arguments and interplay between the majority and dissenting opinions of
5

See Gershwin, infra note 64 and accompanying text.
See Shapiro, infra notes 106-15 and accompanying text.
7
See Gershwin, infra note 64 and accompanying text.
8
See Napster, infra notes 120-25; Grokster, infra notes 88-96; Amazon, infra notes 126-36.
9
See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007).
10
Id. at 793.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 792.
16
See infra note 195 and accompanying text.
17
See infra Part II, notes 22-136 and accompanying text.
18
See infra Part III, notes 137-172 and accompanying text.
6

2008

CREDIT CARD SECONDARY COPYRIGHT LIABILITY

213

Perfect 10.19 Part V presents the future implications of the Perfect 10 decision.20
The case note is concluded in Part VI.21
II.

COPYRIGHTS AND SECONDARY LIABILITY

A. Copyright Law in the United States
A “creative work” is “the product of creative expression” ranging from
blockbuster films to this very article.22 It is a fruit of labor; a creation similar to a
handcrafted chair or a loaf of bread. And like these tangible goods, creative works
carry value: real economic worth in their usefulness and other qualities. Yet,
unlike other goods, the very nature of a creative work often allows its worth to
easily be diluted. For instance, little effort is needed to reproduce another author’s
text and distribute or sell it in place of the author. The original author, who
expended the creative energy essential to bringing the work into being, receives
less compensation and other benefit than would have been received had all
distribution and sale been under the author’s control.23 This creates a chilling
effect on the creative process: a fear of wasted effort that discourages authorship of
new works and potentially hinders intellectual progress. Hoping to avoid such
pitfalls in their developing nation, the United States’ founding fathers took
copyrights into serious concern.24
Thus, the United States Constitution was drafted to include protection for
this creative interest.25 The Copyright Clause of the constitution grants Congress
the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.”26 Acting on this authority, federal legislation has
defined copyright protection and, over history, extended it.27 The scope of
copyright protection generally grants the copyright holder exclusive rights for a
limited period28 to reproduce the work, create derivative works based on the work,
19

See infra Part IV, notes 173-271 and accompanying text.
See infra Part V, notes 272-296 and accompanying text.
21
See infra Part VI and p. 49.
22
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1637 (8th ed. 2004).
23
It is not always solely a matter of losing money: fame and recognition for an author are also
affected by unauthorized copying.
24
Thomas A. Mitchell, Note, Copyright, Congress, and Constitutionality: How the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act Goes Too Far, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2115, 2120-21 (2004).
25
Id. at 2119.
26
U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8. In addition to being the basis for copyrights, this clause is also the
basis for congressional regulation of patents. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 201 (2003). Copyrights
and patents are not to be confused with trademarks, whose protection is targeted towards consumer
identification of commercial items. 15 U.S.C. § 1127; see infra note 232.
27
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 361 (8th ed. 2004). Federal copyright statutes reside within Title
17 of the United States Code. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000 & Supp. V 2005) (defining rights
possessed by copyright holders); 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2000 & Supp. V 2005) (defining infringement of
copyright); 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (defining fair-use non-infringement); 17 U.S.C. § 1201-05 (2000)
(addressing circumvention of anti-copying measures and other new technology issues in copyright).
28
As copyright essentially creates a monopoly, the intent was to limit its duration. Hideaki Shirata,
20
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transfer the work, display the work, and sell or lease the work.29 Protection is
given for “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression,”30 including pictures, video, music, audio recordings, literary text, and
architecture.31 This protection affixes to qualified works at the moment of their
creation; for published works, protection attaches at the time of publication.32
These rules apply nationwide—as of 1978, all state common law and statutes
regarding copyright are preempted by federal laws.33
B. Direct Infringement of Copyright
Under Title 17, a violation of any exclusive right granted by a copyrighted
work constitutes an infringement of copyright by the violator.34 In the event of an
infringement, the copyright holder may sue the infringer subject to the normal
rules of civil procedure.35 The remedies available to the copyright holder include
injunctions36 and monetary damages, including the infringer’s profits.37
However, after Justice Story’s storied opinion in Folsom v. Marsh, we have
an exception to the rule: “fair use”38 violations that don’t constitute infringement.39
The doctrine has since been codified into Title 17, allowing the reproduction and
derivative use of copyrighted materials for purposes like education, news, and
parody.40 Courts use four factors to determine whether a use of copyrighted
material qualifies as fair use: “(1) the purpose and character of the use . . . ; (2) the
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the [relative] amount and substantiality of the
portion used . . . ; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work.”41 Works are thus qualified when they have
The Origin of Two American Copyright Theories: A Case of the Reception of English Law, 30 J. ARTS
MGMT. L. & SOC'Y 193, 201 (2000). Generally, works created during or after 1978 are protected from
the time of creation until seventy years past the author’s death. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000).
29
17 U.S.C. § 106. There is also an exclusive right to perform the work if the work is of a
performable type (e.g., dramatic scripts, choreographies, and music). 17 U.S.C. § 106(4), (6). In
addition to having exclusive rights to sell copies of a work, a copyright holder is allowed to transfer the
copyright of the work itself, or a subset of those rights. 17 U.S.C. § 204 (2000).
30
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
31
Id.; for an enumerated list, see 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)(1)-(8), 1301(a)(1)-(2) (2000). It is important
to note that ideas themselves are not copyrighted—only their expression in a medium is. 17 U.S.C. §
102(b) (2000).
32
17 U.S.C. § 104(a)-(b) (2000). Under the current statute, copyright protection requires no formal
registration of a work, nor does it require marking the work with the omniprevalent “©” or other
copyright notice. However, works created prior to 1978 must be registered in accordance with older
law. See 17 U.S.C. § 408 (2000 & Supp. V. 2005).
33
17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (“Rights within the general scope of copyright . . . are governed exclusively
by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right . . . under the common law or statutes of
any State”).
34
17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (Supp. V 2005).
35
17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2000).
36
17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2000).
37
17 U.S.C. § 504 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
38
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 634 (8th ed. 2004).
39
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
40
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
41
17 U.S.C. § 107(1)-(4).
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diminished negative impact on the interests and incentives of the original copyright
holder, thereby avoiding harms addressed by copyright. The value and usability of
fair uses, to society, are often independent of the authors’ interests in their original
works.42 Furthermore, derivative works may carry forth creative value of their
own, making new interests to fall within copyright’s domain of protection.43
C. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act
The most recent significant change to United States copyright law came with
the controversial44 and technology-conscious Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(“DMCA”) in 1998.45 The new provisions target copyright pirates,46 creating
causes of action47 for the circumvention of copyright protection technology48 and
interference with or falsification of copyright information.49 Both types of conduct
are also subject to criminal law: willful and profit-seeking violations mandate
substantial fines or prison terms.50
While strong new restrictions were given by the DMCA, the DMCA also

42
For example: even though a school library contains many copyrighted books, allowing students
to photocopy text from these books for educational research is not infringement. See MODEL POLICY
CONCERNING COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY PHOTOCOPYING FOR CLASSROOM, RESEARCH AND LIBRARY
RESERVE (American Library Association 1982), available at http://www.cni.org/docs/infopols/
ALA.html. Rather, it’s a fair use because: the author probably won’t lose any sales as a result; the
author’s effort will still be recognized within the student’s bibliography or citations; the reproduction is
of limited scope; and, finally, it furthers good faith educational interests.
43
For instance, parodies represent an important commodity in the marketplace of ideas. In this
marketplace, free expression is necessary for a lively environment in which the better ideas rise to the
top. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). Television programs like South Park depend
on the ability to create derivative work in parody in order to effectively convey social commentary. See
South Park (Comedy Central television broadcast). This results in entirely new works which possess
unique entertainment and philosophical value independent of the derivative source. The South Park
parody of the film “300”, for example, does not replace or diminish interest in the original film. See
South Park: D-Yikes! (Comedy Central television broadcast Apr. 11, 2007); 300 (Warner Bros.
Entertainment, Inc. 2007). Though the two works may share key plot elements, the South Park episode
injects comedy which can’t be found in the movie. The movie, on the other heand, draws audiences
with drama, action, and special effects that aren’t found in its South Park parody. Both can profit in
parallel because each fills a distinct niche, despite some overlap in content. As courts have noted, the
primary objective of copyright law has been to promote “creativity for the general public good.” Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432 (1984) (emphasis added) (citing Fox
Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)). In this case, the public benefit of having two distinct
sources of entertainment outweigh Warner Bros.’ interest in monopolizing 300’s plot premise.
44
Amy P. Bunk, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, 179 A.L.R. FED. 319 (2002). The controversies stemming from the DMCA’s passage
are varied. For instance, some argue that the new provisions of the DMCA exceed congressional
power. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 24. Others contend that the DMCA is unacceptably open to
abuse by those who want to shut down websites for non-copyright reasons. See, e.g., Mike Masnick,
DMCA Misuse: Trying to Take Down a Negative Movie Review, TECHDIRT, Jan. 14, 2008,
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20080113/235553.shtml.
45
17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-05, 512, 4001, 1301-32 (1999).
46
See infra note 75.
47
17 U.S.C. § 1203 (2000).
48
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2000).
49
17 U.S.C. § 1202 (2000).
50
17 U.S.C. § 1204(a) (2000).
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included a “Safe Harbor”51 of powerful provisions designed to protect entities such
as Internet website hosts.52 Under the DMCA Safe Harbor, digital network53
service providers54 are not monetarily liable for third party copyright infringement
occurring on their hardware or across their transmission lines.55 However, such
service providers are subject to subpoena by a copyright holder for the
identification of any infringing customer56 and must comply with a copyright
holder’s request to remove infringing material from the service network.57 Failure
by the service provider to comply with this “take-down notice” allows the
copyright holder to seek injunctive relief in the form of court orders prohibiting
display of the infringing material.58
The significance of the DMCA Safe Harbor is apparent with an examination
of Internet infrastructure. The promulgation of data and ideas relies on the use of
service providers for Internet distribution.
Their presence is essential.
51

See generally 17 U.S.C. § 512.
See infra note 54. Web hosts are companies which own, apportion, and rent use of servers.
Marshall Brain, How Stuff Works, How Web Servers Work: Clients and Servers,
http://computer.howstuffworks.com/web-server4.htm. A server is a computer with a persistent Internet
connection on which Internet files and documents are stored and distributed to other Internet users on
request—it acts as a physical and virtual repository for Internet data. Id.; see infra note 158 for more
information about the Internet.
53
This seems to generally refer to the Internet, though policy implications make it likely that other
digital networks would qualify, such as those used in cell phone communication. See infra notes 54-55
and accompanying text.
54
For purposes of the DMCA, a “service provider” is “a provider of online services or network
access, or the operator of facilities therefor . . . .” 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B). As it is apparent in the text
of the statute, the courts routinely apply DMCA service provider status over “a broad variety of Internet
activities” without needing to split hairs. Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090,
1100 (W.D. Wash. 2004). If the issue at action deals only with § 512(a) “transitory digital network
communications,” then the definition is limited only to service providers which deal in the routing of
the communications. Corbis, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1100 n.5; see 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(A). Some
examples of DMCA-qualifying service providers: Internet access providers, website hosts, usersubmitted-content websites, and online auctions. See, e.g., Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072 (9th
Cir. 2004) (Internet access provider AOL treated as a DMCA service provider); Tur v. YouTube, Inc.,
No. CV064436 FMC AJWX, slip op. (C.D.Cal. 2007) (user-submitted video site YouTube treated as a
DMCA service provider); Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1088 (C.D. Cal. 2001)
(online auction lister “eBay clearly meets the DMCA’s broad definition of online ‘service provider’”).
55
17 U.S.C. § 512(a). The “third party” nature of the infringement must be emphasized: the Safe
Harbor does not apply to service providers who actively post infringing materials themselves or
otherwise take an editorial role regarding the infringing content. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c). This mirrors
the publisher/distributor distinction in defamation law whereby an innocent distributor of a publication
(such as a newspaper delivery boy) is not liable for defamatory content contained in the publication’s
text. 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander; Injurious Falsehood § 177 (2008). A distributor is only liable if he
possesses some editorial control over the publication, like the liable publisher does. Id. That is, one is
liable for defamation only if they have had the opportunity to review and change the defamatory
content. Accordingly, service providers who unknowingly link to or provide locations of infringing
material are also exempt from related monetary liability. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (d).
56
17 U.S.C. § 512(h).
57
17 U.S.C. § 512(g). This is also known as the “take-down notice” requirement. While it seems
as though this provision could open the door to a flood of fraudulent notices demanding action by a
service provider, the DMCA includes harsh penalties, including attorney fees, for misrepresentations.
17 U.S.C. § 512(f). Furthermore, if the true copyright holder has had material improperly removed
under the DMCA, they can submit a counter-notice to restore the materials. 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(3).
58
17 U.S.C. § 512(j). The restraining orders generally force the service provider to block access to
the particular material or to block the infringing customer from the service altogether. 17 U.S.C. §
512(j)(1)(i)-(ii).
52
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Furthermore, any given web host may have thousands of separate parties utilizing
its services for the storage of hundreds of computer files—monitoring each of them
for copyright infringement is highly impractical. While copyright interests still
obligate a service provider to remove infringing material, the investigative duty is
shifted to the copyright holders through the notice provision. In the meantime,
service providers are able to devote their resources towards improving other areas
of business without fear of bankruptcy brought on by a third party’s actions.59
Thus, Internet development is furthered while copyright holders still maintain an
avenue through which they can protect their interests.
D. Contributory Infringement of Copyright
As evidenced by the need for protections such as the DMCA Safe Harbor,
avenues exist for extending liability beyond direct infringers. In greater tort law,
“one who knowingly participates in or furthers a tortuous act is jointly and
severally liable with the prime tortfeasor.”60 Such is also the case with copyright
infringement,61 as the Copyright Act does not differentiate among levels of
participation.62 A common law doctrine serving to fill that gap, called contributory
copyright infringement, has been described as descending from enterprise liability
in tort law.63 Under this doctrine, “one who, with knowledge of the infringing
activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of
another, may be held liable.”64
Even acts such as advertising an infringing product can constitute
contributory infringement, so long as there is knowledge.65 One helpful and
historic example of involvement-liability interactions in contributory infringement
is the Screen Gems case, from deep in the reign of the phonograph record.66 In
Screen Gems, a record album of hit songs was produced, infringing the copyright
of several songs owned by the plaintiff.67 The plaintiff brought action against
several defendants involved in different areas of the album’s production and

59
Because of this policy concern, the DMCA Safe Harbor is likely to protect beyond just the
Internet. Other technological services may also be used by customers for infringement. See, e.g., supra
note 54.
60
Niel Boorstyn, 1 BOORSTYN ON COPYRIGHT § 10.06[2], 10-21 (1994).
61
Id.
62
Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1161 (2d. Cir. 1971).
63
Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996).
64
Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162. The same rule is applied in the Ninth Circuit. Perfect 10, 494 F.3d
at 795. While the liability here is described as “secondary” or even “vicarious,” it is important to note
that contributory infringement differs from vicarious infringement, which also gives rise to secondary
or vicarious liability and often appears alongside contributory infringement in lawsuits. See infra note
116. Under vicarious infringement, a defendant is liable if he profits from infringement while
possessing a right or ability to control the infringer’s conduct. See Shapiro, infra notes 106-15 and
accompanying text.
65
Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399 (D.C.N.Y. 1966).
66
Id. The phonograph record was the primary medium for recorded music and other audio prior to
the popularization of magnetic tape recording and, later, the compact disc. See Steven Schoenherr,
Recording Technology History, http://history.sandiego.edu/GEN/recording/notes.html.
67
Screen Gems, 256 F. Supp. at 401.
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promotion.68 On motion for summary judgment by the defendants, the court held
that the radio station that broadcast the advertisements for the album and the
company that packaged and shipped the album could both be found liable for
contributory infringement.69 The court also held that the defendant advertising
agency, which created the ads, could also be found liable.70 For these three
defendants, the court reasoned that a factual evaluation was needed to determine
whether they knew or reasonably should have known about the infringement—if
they continued acting in spite of such knowledge, the elements for contributory
infringement would be satisfied.71 This result was echoed in Gershwin, which held
that a concert-promotion association “‘caused . . . copyright infringement’”72 by
creating an audience for artists whom the association knew were performing
unlicensed copyrighted works.73
Likewise, operating a forum for the sale of infringing material can give rise
to liability.74 In Fonovisa, vendors rented a booth from defendant swap meet in
order to sell pirated75 recordings.76 The swap meet’s operators had actual
knowledge of the activity, through third party notice and their own investigation,
though they participated no further than allowing the infringers to operate as part
of the swap meet.77 Nevertheless, copyright holders filed suit against the swap
meet and successfully established contributory infringement.78 Here, the Ninth
Circuit had “little difficulty in holding . . . material contribution”79 because the
swap meet was the knowing source of the “environment and the market for
counterfeit recording sales to thrive.”80

68

Id.
Id. at 405.
70
Id. at 404. An officer and stockholder of the advertising agency, also named as a defendant
despite being on a “leave of absence from corporate affairs” at the time, was held not liable as a matter
of law. Id. at 404-05.
71
Id.
72
Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1163 (quoting Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., 312
F.Supp. 581, 583 (D.C.N.Y. 1970)).
73
Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1163.
74
Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264.
75
In the context of copyrights, “piracy” has little to do with swashbucklers, Jolly Rogers, or the
high seas; rather, it is the term used to describe unauthorized duplication of copyrighted materials, as
well as distribution of such duplicates. The Software & Information Industry Association, What is
Piracy?, http://www.siia.net/piracy/whatis.asp. Individuals who participate in unauthorized duplication
are known as “pirates” while the copies they make are known as “pirated” materials. Id.
76
Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 261.
77
Id. The swap meet operators argued that this was “passive” participation. Id. at 264.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id. The Ninth Circuit here adopted the Third Circuit’s rationale in Columbia Pictures, whereby
providing facilities for infringement was enough to create liability. Id.; see Columbia Pictures Indus.,
Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1986). Specifically, the facility contributions in Fonovisa were
“provision of space, utilities, parking, advertising, plumbing, and customers.” Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at
264. According to the circuit court in Fonovisa, overt promotion or encouragement of infringement
was not required. Id. Furthermore, it did not seem to matter to the court if the infringing materials
could have been distributed in an alternate forum, only that “it would be difficult for the infringing
activity to take place in the massive quantities alleged” had the swap meet denied the direct infringers.
Id.
69
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Though contributory infringement liability seems to have a long reach, it
does not always extend to creation and sale of products that facilitate infringement.
When the advance of consumer technology began enabling easy at-home
duplication of copyrighted works, device manufacturers suddenly saw themselves
under fire for contributory infringement in the landmark Supreme Court case Sony
v. Universal.81 In Sony, copyright holders of certain television programming sued
manufacturers of video tape recorder (“VTR”)82 devices, alleging that consumers
were using the VTRs to infringe copyright.83 While the case is often cited for its
lengthy discussion on fair use84 personal recording of video, the decision
ultimately hung on a new standard:85 a product does not create secondary liability
if it is “capable of commercially significant noninfringing uses.”86 After reviewing
the district court’s findings, the Supreme Court held that the VTRs in Sony did
indeed have “substantial noninfringing uses” and thus, the manufacturers were not
liable for contributory copyright infringement,87 despite the certainty that direct
infringement was occurring using their devices.
The Sony standard does not override the typical contributory infringement
test in all cases, however. In Grokster, copyright holders sued the makers of
computer software which was used to distribute computer files on the internet.88
There, the defendant software company argued for an application of Sony, due to
their software’s capability for substantial noninfringing use,89 which gained them a
victory on initial appeal.90 When Grokster reached the Supreme Court, however,
the Court was prompted to temper its decision for clarity.91 The Court pointed out
that, unlike the defendants in Sony,92 the defendants in Grokster intentionally
catered to infringing users93 and induced these users to use the software to
81

Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
While the subject matter of Sony specifically regarded Betamax-format “VTR”, the technology
and usage differs little from the successive Video Home System (“VHS”) format video cassette
recorder (“VCR”) or even digital hard-disk-based personal video recorders (“PVR”) such as TiVo. See
What is TiVo?, http://www.tivo.com/whatistivo/index.html.
83
Sony, 464 U.S. at 419-20.
84
Id. at 454 (held: use of VTRs to temporarily record inconveniently scheduled programs for
viewing at a more convenient time, also known as “time shifting”, constituted fair use). For an
overview of fair use in copyright, see supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
85
Id. at 442. In this case, the Court applied the staple article of commerce doctrine from patent law
as a balancing of policy. Id. at 441-42. The rationale behind this application is reminiscent of fair
use—in the end, the infringement does not materially destroy the copyright holder’s interests. Id.
86
Id. at 442.
87
Id. at 435.
88
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919-20 (2005). Offensive
to the plaintiffs here was, of course, the fact that many of the files transferred using the defendants’
software infringed copyright. Id. For a more detailed explanation of file sharing software, see A&M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
89
Grokster, 545 U.S. at 927.
90
Id. The appeals court here was affirming (albeit for separate reasons) the district court decision,
which held against liability because it found that the defendant lacked actual knowledge of
infringement. Id.
91
Id. at 934. The Court stated that the Ninth Circuit had misinterpreted Sony and that the intent
was never to “displace other theories of secondarily liability.” Id.
92
Id. at 937.
93
Id. at 939.
82
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infringe.94 Thus, Sony is not meant to apply because Grokster already handily met
the traditional test for contributory liability:95 it knowingly induced the infringing
conduct of another.96
E. Vicarious Infringement of Copyright
Absent direct or contributory involvement with infringement, a party may
still be liable for vicarious copyright infringement. Again, we look to tort law for
the roots: the principle of respondeat superior creates liability for employers on the
acts of their employees even with no actual participation (contributory or
otherwise) by the employer.97 For the employer, this is to be regarded as a liability
inherent in enterprise,98 or perhaps liability stemming simply from the mere right
of control, regardless of whether the tortuous act was actually commanded.99
While the standard respondeat superior doctrine had already been applied to
employees who infringed copyright while working,100 the historic decision in
Shapiro extended the reach beyond the employer-employee relationship.101 The
general rule for vicarious copyright infringement now is the same as it appeared in
Shapiro: a party is liable if they had “(1) the right and ability to supervise the
infringing conduct and (2) a direct financial interest in the infringing activity.”102
Vicarious infringement in older common law was divided into two basic
models of application: the “landlord-tenant” model and the “dance hall” model.103
In the former, a landlord who leases premises to an infringing tenant is not liable
for the tenant’s infringing conduct if the landlord is unaware of the activity, does
not contribute to it, and receives no benefit other than the usual rent payments.104
In the latter, one who manages a dance hall105 is liable for infringement by live
performers, who are considered almost as employees in the respondeat superior

94

Id. at 937-38.
Grokster, 545 U.S. at 941. More specifically, the Court described the Sony doctrine as dealing
“with a claim of liability based solely on distributing a product with alternative lawful and unlawful
uses, with knowledge” rather than cases where a contribution to infringement is more apparent. Id. at
941 (emphasis added).
96
Id. at 940-41.
97
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1338 (8th ed. 2004) (in Latin: “let the superior make answer”). This
doctrine also applies to agent/principal relationships. Id.
98
See Wilson v. Drake, 87 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 1996).
99
See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 262.
100
Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (C.A.N.Y. 1963) (citing, as an
example, M. Witmark & Sons v. Calloway, 22 F.2d 412, 414 (E.D.Tenn. 1927)).
101
Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 261-62.
102
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 802 (citing Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1078; A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster,
Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001)).
103
Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 307. The Shapiro court describes it as “two lines of precedent . . . .” Id.
104
Id. (citing Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F.2d 686, 688 (2d Cir. 1938)). Even though rent collected by
the landlord may have indirectly come from infringement proceeds, rental payments are not sufficiently
connected to the infringement to extend liability. Id.
105
The “dance hall” terminology may appear alien to younger readers, but the establishments
referred to are synonymous with modern-day nightclubs, bars, and lounges which offer live or recorded
music as entertainment for patrons. Thus, if a bar hires a local band to perform and the band performs
copyrighted songs without permission, the bar may be liable.
95
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sense. The Shapiro court undertook the task of negotiating both models with
regards to another business arrangement in the phonograph record industry.106 In
Shapiro, a record vendor operated as a department in defendant company’s stores
and sold infringing records.107 The store company deducted taxes and its own
commission from the vendor’s cash proceeds.108 The vendor’s employees were
expected to abide by the store’s rules of conduct, though they were not actual
employees of the store.109 Otherwise, the store company was not involved in the
vendor’s record sales and had no knowledge of the infringing activity.110 Despite
the lack of knowledge here, which is reminiscent of the “landlord” model, the
Shapiro court held this situation as more analogous to the “dance hall” cases.111
The court reasoned that the store “had a most definite financial interest in the
success” of the vendor, because of the commission.112 Further, they “retained the
ultimate right of supervision over the conduct of the record concession and its
employees.”113 Thus, as far as the court was concerned, this was close enough to
an employer-employee relationship to render respondeat-superior-like liability.114
The court also had policy considerations behind this result, stating that such
companies would exercise greater care in preventing infringement because of this
decision, while being in the best position to do so anyway.115
Vicarious copyright infringement claims often appear alongside contributory
infringement claims, due to their similarity of application.116 And in many cases,
the same outcome has resulted from the same facts. In Fonovisa, the swap meet
which hosted infringing vendors retained all the necessary power needed to police
the infringers: not only did they create rules governing participants, but they also
patrolled the premises and reserved the right to remove vendors from the swap
meet.117 The defendants argued that their position more closely resembled the
landlord model118 due to their position as a lessor to vendors. Despite that fact,
those other factors linked the swap meet to the conduct of the vendors and firmly
established the element of right to control. As for financial benefit, the court

106

Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 308.
Id. at 306.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id. at 308.
112
Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 308.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id. Also, the court argued that refraining to impose liability here would create a loophole for
stores wishing to sell infringing goods without consequence. Id. at 309.
116
For example, the defendants in Gershwin promoted an orchestra’s performances while knowing
that the orchestra was infringing copyright. Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1163. At the same time, they also
received fees from the orchestra while providing “direction in matters such as” copyright. Id. Thus,
their conduct matched both contributory infringement and vicarious infringement; and the defendants
were simultaneously found liable for both. Id. at 1162. Both types of secondary infringement were
alleged in Grokster, though the Supreme Court saw no need to evaluate vicarious infringement after
already resolving contributory infringement there. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930 n.9.
117
Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 263.
118
See supra notes 103-05.
107
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reasoned that swap meet operators saw increased income from the parking and
admission fees of customers arriving solely to purchase the infringing materials—
more than enough to satisfy this element of the claim.119
The Fonovisa application of vicarious infringement has applied handily to
high-tech analogs as well. In Napster, similar to Grokster,120 the defendant
company was sued for creating software that allowed widespread Internet
distribution of infringing material.121 There, infringing activities on the software
network was likened to the swap meet in Fonovisa, since the defendant created
incentives for more users to join and increased its own ad revenue as a result.122
Furthermore, network operators easily had the capability to detect infringing
activity123 and to block offending users.124 Thus, the vicarious infringement
holding here was affirmed.125
Not all internet services associated with infringement are at risk, however.
In Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, the ubiquitous search engine Google126 was sued
over its image indexing service.127 This service automatically indexed publiclyavailable images on the Internet and allowed users to search for particular ones.128
Included in the index were images which infringed copyright, published by a third
party on a separate website and made available for search by Google’s pan-Internet
service.129 Among the various claims brought by the copyright holders was a
claim for vicarious copyright infringement.130 While invoking Grokster131 and
Fonovisa,132 the Ninth Circuit held it unlikely that the plaintiff could establish the

119

Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 263.
See Grokster, supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text. Both cases deal with Internet file
sharing as the means for copyright infringement.
121
Napster, 239 F.3d at 1011.
122
Id. at 1023.
123
Id. at 1024.
124
Id. at 1023. The defendants even had rules of conduct similar to Fonovisa’s swap meet,
reserving them the right to “refuse service and terminate accounts” on the network. Id.
125
Id. at 1024.
126
Due to the vast number of web sites on the Internet, the “search engine” has long been a popular
tool for users seeking particular sites. Curt Franklin, How Internet Search Engines Work,
http://computer.howstuffworks.com/search-engine.htm. With a search engine, a user need only submit
a phrase describing their desired website and the search engine software compares the phrase against
the engine’s large index of websites, creating a list of suggested matches for the user to visit. Id. At the
time of this writing, Google has established itself as the dominant search engine through its unique
indexing method. Google Corporate Information: Company Overview, http://www.google.com/intl/en/
corporate/index.html. Google has expanded its services to include online searches for digital images,
among others. Id. As of this writing, all Google services online are free, with revenue generated for the
company purely through advertising sales. Id.
127
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701 at 711.
128
Id. at 711. As part of the indexing process, not only is the location of the image stored for web
searchers, but a downsized copy of the image (called a “thumbnail” for its diminutive dimensions) is
stored, in order to give web searchers a preview of their results without having to download all of the
full images in their results list. Id.; see supra note 126 for more on Google and Internet searching.
129
Amazon, 487 F.3d at 713.
130
Id. at 729.
131
See supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text.
132
See supra notes 74-80, 116-19 and accompanying text.
120
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requisite control element of vicarious infringement.133 According to the court, the
plaintiff “ha[d] not shown that Google ha[d] contracts with [infringing] third-party
websites that empower Google to stop or limit them”—as opposed to the vendors
in Fonovisa who operated under the swap meet’s express regulations.134
Ultimately, the infringing activity was occurring on third-party websites outside of
Google’s control, so the court was unable to see that the control requirement was
satisfied.135 As a result, the court affirmed the district court’s holding that the
plaintiffs were unlikely to prove vicarious infringement.136
III. PERFECT 10 V. VISA: FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff Perfect 10, Inc. is an adult entertainment company which
photographs nude models and creates other media content for publication, among
other related activities.137 Relevant to this case is Perfect 10’s website, which
offers digital photos and other content exclusively to paying subscribers.138
Perfect 10 claims copyright over content featured in its magazine and on its
website.139 Perfect 10 also claims ownership and registration of the “PERFECT
10”, “P10”, and “PERFECT10.COM” trademarks.140 Lastly, Perfect 10 claims
“blanket publicity rights” for models they have photographed.141
Perfect 10 alleged that several unnamed parties directly copied and altered
materials from Perfect 10’s members-only area.142 These parties then offered the

133

Amazon, 487 F.3d at 730.
Id. As to the potential effect of Google’s service to “empower” infringers by pointing additional
customers (i.e., users of the image search) towards an infringing site, the court argued that “Google
lacks the practical ability” to selectively exclude images from their service. Id. at 731.
135
Id. at 730-31.
136
Id. at 731. With the control element failed, the court did not bother addressing the financial
benefit element. Amazon, 487 F.3d at 731. However, for contributory infringement, the court held that
Google could be held liable if knowledge of the infringement could be shown. Id. at 729.
137
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 793; see also Dawn Kawamoto, Porn, Google and the courts, CNET
NEWS.COM, March 3, 2006, http://www.news.com/Porn,-Google-and-the-courts/2008-1030_3-60457
32.html (interview of Perfect 10’s founder, including the company’s anti-cosmetic-surgery philosophy).
The Perfect 10 magazine has ceased publication since this case was decided, though it continues selling
back issues and subscriptions to its website. See Perfect10.com Summer 2007, http://www.perfect
10.com/popups/magazine.html (site may contain sexually explicit material); see also Perfect 10
Magazine: MagazineCity, http://www.ccgdata.com/6404-4.html (site may contain sexually explicit
material).
138
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 793. Subscriptions are purchased by month or blocks of months. See
PERFECT 10: Join Now, http://perfect10.com/join.html (site may contain sexually explicit material).
For more information about the Internet and Internet business, see infra notes 158-59 and
accompanying text.
139
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 793 (citing Plaintiff and Appellant Perfect 10, Inc.'s Reply Brief, Perfect
10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 05-15170)). Perfect 10’s
ownership of these copyrights is not disputed in the case.
140
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 793; see also U.S. Trademark No. 75,584,611 (filed Nov. 6, 1998); U.S.
Trademark No. 78,481,207 (filed Sept. 9, 2004); U.S. Trademark No. 75,292,307 (filed Apr. 27, 1999)
(registration records for three marks belonging to Perfect 10, Inc. related to their adult entertainment
and media services).
141
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 793.
142
Id.
134
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materials on websites of their own for sale.143 For the purposes of this case, this is
treated without dispute as direct copyright infringement by the unnamed parties
against Perfect 10.144 Sale of the infringing materials was carried out using the
defendants’ electronic payment processing service.145 As Perfect 10 was unable to
stop the direct infringers through other means,146 Perfect 10 sent notices to the
defendants about the infringing activity.147 The defendants took no action in
response.148
Defendant VISA, Inc. (Visa International Service Association, Inc., or
“Visa”) describes itself as “the world’s largest retail electronic payments network”
providing credit card and other payment platforms for their “clients”: an
international collection of thousands of financial institutions.149 These member
institutions issue Visa cards to their own customers for the customers’ use with
participating merchants.150 The cards, known colloquially as “credit cards”, create
limited loans of money from the financial institution to the customer.151 Through a
credit card, merchants providing goods or services to the cardholder are paid
directly by the issuing bank, at the cardholder’s election and convenience.152
These charges are then repaid to the bank at a later time by the cardholder along
with interest and other fees.153 Visa provides clearinghouse services to track
transactions among participating customers, member banks, and merchants across
the Visa computer network.154 Visa’s only direct contractual relationships are with

143
Id. While Visa did not expressly concede these occurrences, the issue has gone largely
uncontested. See generally id. Presumably, the infringing items (e.g., erotic pictures and videos) were
offered at a price lower than the cost of regular membership at Perfect 10’s website.
144
Id. at 800.
145
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d. at 793.
146
While no specific reasons were given as to why Perfect 10 was unable to stop the infringers, it
was mentioned that the infringers belonged to several different foreign countries. Id.
147
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 793. In the notices, Perfect 10 identified the infringing websites, stated
the nature of the infringement, and informed of the defendants’ involvement in the infringers’ business.
Id.
148
Id. It is unclear whether Perfect 10 requested specific action (such as revocation of the payment
processing service) be taken by the defendants.
149
Visa Inc. Corporate Overview, 1, http://www.corporate.visa.com/av/pdf/Visa_Inc_
Overview.pdf. Another named defendant, Humboldt Bank, is a financial institution operating as a
member bank in the Visa network. See Jim Bruene, Humboldt Bank Offers Secured and Unsecured
Visa Cards, NETBANKER, June 19, 1997, http://www.netbanker.com/1997/06/humboldt_bank_offers_
secured_unsecured_visa.html. The other remaining named defendants, First Data Corporation,
Cardservice International, Inc., and Mastercard International, Inc., are credit/debit networks similar to
Visa. About First Data, http://www.firstdata.com/about/index.htm; Cardservice International Company
profile, http://www.cardservice.com/company-profile.aspx; MasterCard Corporate Overview,
http://www.mastercard.com/us/company/en/index.html. While Cardservice International, Inc. and
Mastercard International, Inc. appear to be involved with this case in the same capacity that Visa is,
First Data Corporation may have been named only with regards to a separate, unrelated action by
Perfect 10.
150
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 793; see also Visa Inc. Corporate Overview, supra note 149 at 1. Visa
reports 1.4 billion issued cards and 27 million merchant outlets worldwide. Id.
151
HowStuffWorks How Credit Cards Work, http://money.howstuffworks.com/credit-card.htm.
152
Id.
153
Id. Interest rates, fees, spending limits, and other terms of the card agreement are set by the
issuing bank alone. Visa Inc. Corporate Overview, supra note 149 at 1.
154
Emery v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 95 Cal. App. 4th 952, 956 (Cal. App. 3d 2002).

2008

CREDIT CARD SECONDARY COPYRIGHT LIABILITY

225

member banks, not cardholders or merchants.155 Thus, Visa’s involvement is
limited to regulating member bank behavior, collecting fees from member banks,
and promoting the Visa name to the benefit of network participants.156
Due to its instantaneous and electronic nature, credit card payments have
become the “primary engine of electronic commerce”157 where cash and other
payment methods are inconvenient or even impracticable. In this case, “electronic
commerce” refers to business conducted over the Internet.158 There, as with
traditional commerce, merchants are able to offer goods and services through
virtual storefronts or direct communications targeted at customers accessing the
Internet.159 In order to make payments, online customers can provide their credit
card number and authorize a charge, allowing the online merchant to utilize
networks such as Visa’s in order to obtain instant payment from the customer’s
issuing bank.160 Indeed, this payment system is so widespread that even Perfect
10’s website is a participating merchant, accepting Visa payments for membership
subscriptions.161
Following the defendants’ inaction regarding Perfect 10’s notices, Perfect 10
filed suit in federal district court, bringing actions for (1) contributory copyright
infringement, (2) vicarious copyright infringement, (3) contributory trademark
infringement, and (4) vicarious trademark infringement.162 Additionally, Perfect
10 brought claims under California state law for “unfair competition and false
advertising, violation of the statutory and common law right of publicity, libel, and
intentional interference with prospective economic advantage.”163 The defendants

155

Id.
Id. By promoting its name, Visa encourages widespread use of its network, thus promoting
extended compatibility for participants. For example, cardholders benefit when more merchants accept
Visa for payment and also when more banks are available to compete for better issuance deals.
157
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 794. The importance of credit card processing to Internet commerce
(and, consequently, to the legislature) has been specifically recognized by the Ninth Circuit and applied
to its reasoning. Id.; see infra note 180 and accompanying text. Alternative payment methods do exist,
however. One popular example is PayPal (http://www.paypal.com/). PayPal is the primary payment
system for its current owner, online auctioneer eBay (http://www.ebay.com/) and allows a user to store
money (received from other PayPal accounts, withdrawn from the user’s bank account, or transferred
from the user’s credit card) for withdrawal or transfer to other PayPal accounts. Margaret Kane, eBay
picks up PayPal for $1.5 billion, CNET NEWS.COM, July 8, 2002, http://www.news.com/2100-1017941964.html. In the event that a PayPal user wishes to use add credit card funds to their PayPal
account, normal credit card processors such as Visa must be used.
158
The Internet is a global network linking millions of computers for the purposes of
communication, information sharing, entertainment, and business. Among other functions of the
Internet, computer users can freely publish and view documents known as “web pages” to and from the
Internet public. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Vint Cerf,
A Brief History of the Internet and Related Networks, http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/cerf.shtml.
159
Marshall Brain, How E-commerce Works, http://communication.howstuffworks.com/
ecommerce.htm.
160
Consolidated Answering Brief of All Defendants-Appellees at 9, Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l
Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 05-15170) (customer requests card processing, merchant
forwards to Visa, Visa forwards to appropriate bank, bank accepts and transfers funds or denies,
merchant relays the outcome to customer).
161
See Secure Purchase for Perfect 10, https://wnu.com/secure/form.cgi?f83+ptf83m1c+a+pa.
162
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 793.
163
Id. Perfect 10 is a California corporation. Plaintiff and Appellant Perfect 10, Inc.’s Reply Brief
at 1, Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 05-15170). Lastly,
156
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filed a 12(b)(6) motion164 which was granted by the district court.165 The libel and
intentional interference claims were dismissed with prejudice, while leave to
amend was granted for Perfect 10’s other claims.166 Perfect 10 amended its
complaint with the remaining claims “essentially repeated” and the defendants
made another 12(b)(6) motion.167 This motion was also granted by the district
court and all claims were dismissed with prejudice.168 Perfect 10 appealed the
district court’s dismissal,169 arguing that the contributory and vicarious copyright
and trademark infringement claims had been properly pled.170 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision with two judges in the
majority and one dissenting.171 Both the majority and dissenting opinions are
analyzed in the next section.172
IV. THE PERFECT 10 V. VISA DECISION
A. The Majority Opinion
Circuit Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr. begins the majority opinion with a brief
overview of the case procedural background173 and gives the court’s majority
disposition.174 This is followed by the recitation of facts,175 a more detailed
procedural history,176 and a short discussion of jurisdiction.177 The standard of
review for the district court’s dismissal is de novo for all claims.178
Judge Smith then begins the discussion with an explanation of the choice in
defendants179 and a nod to the legislative policy in favor of Internet commerce.180
there was an unrelated claim that defendant First Data Corporation improperly blacklisted Perfect 10’s
merchant account. See Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 793.
164
See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (motion to dismiss for the “failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted”).
165
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 793.
166
Id.
167
Id.
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
See Plaintiff and Appellant's Reply Brief at Perfect 10, Inc.'s Reply Brief, Perfect 10, Inc. v.
Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 05-15170).
171
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 792.
172
See Part IV, infra notes 173-271 and accompanying text.
173
See supra notes 162-70 and accompanying text.
174
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 792-93; see supra note 171 and accompanying text.
175
See supra notes 137-61 and accompanying text.
176
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 793.
177
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 793-94. Original jurisdiction over the federal claims is given to the
district court through 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338; supplemental jurisdiction covers the state law claims
because of § 1367. § 1291 gives appellate jurisdiction to the Ninth Circuit, which writes this opinion.
178
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 794. Thus, facts must be construed in favor of Perfect 10, the plaintiff
and appealing party. Id. (citing Rodriguez v. Panaviotou, 314 F.3d 979, 983 (9th Cir. 2002)). Circuit
Judge Kozinski contends that this standard is sorely missed by the majority. Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 819
(Kozinski, J., dissenting).
179
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 794. Made clear here is the decision to sue involved parties other than
the direct infringers. Id. The direct infringers are apparently out of reach of judicial enforcement. Id.
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Next, Judge Smith evaluates Perfect 10’s claim for contributory infringement
of copyright,181 stating that the requirements are essentially the same between the
Ninth Circuit and the United States Supreme Court:182 knowledge of the
infringement and either inducement, causation, or material contribution.183 With
regards to the doctrine’s application to the Internet, Judge Smith cites the
contributory infringement varieties found in Napster, Grokster, and Amazon.184
Smith also notes possible application of the noninfringing-uses doctrine of Sony.185
Judge Smith declines to “address the Defendants’ knowledge of the
infringing activity” because the court has decided that Perfect 10 has failed to meet
the other prong of the contributory infringement test: material contribution or
inducement.186 Discussion is provided for the two remaining elements of the

at 810 n.1 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (quoting First Amended Complaint at 8, Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa
Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 05-15170)). The defendants here are favored
targets for copyright litigation where the real infringers are overseas. Susan Crawford, Perfect10 -stretching towards private police, SUSAN CRAWFORD BLOG, July 4, 2007, http://scrawford.
blogware.com/blog/_archives/2007/7/4/3071711.html. The court also points out that “Perfect 10’s
complaint does not clearly specify which of Perfect 10’s rights are being infringed,” guessing that
Perfect 10 intended reproduction, derivative works, distribution, and public display. Perfect 10, 494
F.3d at 794 n.1; see 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1).
180
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 794. Specifically, the two congressional interests here are Internet
development and the Internet free market, to which “credit cards serve as the primary engine” according
to this court. Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1)). Judge Smith mentions the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (“DMCA”) as further affirmation of this. Id. n.2 (citing S. Rep. 105-190, at 1-2 (1998));
see 17 U.S.C. § 512.
181
See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
182
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 794-95.
183
Id. at 795 (quoting Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1076 (citing Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162)).
184
Id. at 795; see Napster, supra notes 120-25; Grokster, supra notes 88-96; Amazon, supra notes
126-36 and accompanying text.
185
Id. at 795 n.3; see supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text. Judge Smith admits, however,
that Perfect 10 is not attempting to argue along the lines of this doctrine. Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 785
n.3.
186
Id. at 795. Were this element discussed by the majority, it most certainly would have been met
for the purposes of reversing the dismissal. Since notices and identifications of infringing activity have
been alleged by Perfect 10, the action cannot be dismissed for lack of knowledge by the defendant. Id.;
see Plaintiff and Appellant Perfect 10, Inc.'s Reply Brief at 13, Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n,
494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 05-15170). Furthermore, the receipt of notice is not disputed by the
defendants, pointing even more strongly towards the existence of the requisite knowledge. Perfect 10,
494 F.3d at 793.
Here, Judge Smith also takes the opportunity to address arguments relating to the DMCA’s safeharbor provision. Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 795 n.4; see also supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
Judge Smith asserts that the defendants here do not qualify as service providers under the DMCA.
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 795 n.4. No analysis or citation is provided to support this conclusion that an
online credit card processor is outside the “broad scope” of the DMCA’s service provider definition.
See supra note 54. Regardless, Judge Smith further argues that Perfect 10 desires an “anomalous
result” in that the take-down provision normally applies to parties who have the power to actually
remove or block infringing content; and this is outside of Visa’s power. Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 795
n.4. Judge Kozinski of the dissent seems to think (with an equal lack of support provided) that Visa is a
DMCA service provider and entitled to the same protections as a typical Internet access provider. Id. at
824 n.25 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Judge Kozinski’s argument is indeed in line with the DMCA safeharbor policy and procedure of infringing third parties and their passive service providers. See supra
note 55. While Judge Smith is right insofar as Visa’s inability to participate in take-down compliance,
it’s not the case that Visa is off the hook completely. Judge Smith seems to argue that allowing Visa
into the DMCA would mean granting the safe-harbor protection without also creating the act-afternotice responsibility. Service providers are restricted by more than just the take-down obligations,
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second prong, however.187
In addressing the material contribution element, Judge Smith affirms that the
defendants had “no direct connection to th[e] infringement.”188 He first
characterizes the infringement as resting “on the reproduction, alteration, display
and distribution Perfect 10’s images over the Internet.”189 He then notes that none
of these listed infringements occur over the defendants’ systems and that the
defendants did not aid the infringers except to allow receipt of profits.190 Judge
Smith argues that payments are not important here, as every other infringement
occurring in this case “can occur without payment.”191 He argues even further that
this other infringement would occur without payment.192 As support, Judge Smith
uses Napster, where the infringement took place without monetary transactions.193
however. The DCMA also provides an injunctive relief option against service providers despite their
immunity to monetary relief claims! 17 U.S.C. § 512(j). The types of relief available here are much
more fitting for defendants such as Visa. For instance, a plaintiff could obtain “an order restraining the
service provider from providing access to a subscriber or account holder of the service provider’s
system or network who is engaging in infringing activity . . . .” 17 U.S.C. § 512(j)(1)(A)(ii).
187
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 795-802.
188
Id. at 796.
189
Id. Oddly missing here is the sale of Perfect 10’s images, which, of course, provides the
necessary link to the defendants of this case. Sale of copyrighted materials is indeed an exclusive right
for copyright holders under 17 U.S.C. §106(3) (“to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted
work to the public by sale”), thus making unauthorized sale infringement under 17 U.S.C. §501(a)
(“Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright holder . . . is an infringer”). While
it’s clear how this aids the court’s argument, Judge Smith gives no reasons why infringing sale is not an
item on which “infringement rests on” here. Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 796.
190
Id. Here, Judge Smith draws distinction from Fonovisa, where the infringing sale and
distribution took place directly on the defendants’ premises. Id.; see Fonovisa, supra notes 74-80 and
accompanying text. According to Judge Smith, it is the locality of distribution that solely mattered
there. Id.; see also id. at 798 n.8 (yet another distinction, this time “between location services and
payment services”). Since the defendants of this case were only involved in payments rather than the
actual transfer of infringing materials, Judge Smith reasons that they are unconnected with the
infringement. Id. at 796. The reasoning in Fonovisa doesn’t indicate that the locality of distribution is
of particular importance above others, however. While the facts of Fonovisa left the court no choice
but to focus on distribution locality, contributory infringement is described in much more general terms:
“a company ‘is responsible for the torts of those it permits on its premises . . . .’” Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at
265 (quoting Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Serv., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir.
1992)). Judge Smith also distinguishes from Amazon, Napster, and Grokster, which all involved
services that aided in finding infringing material online. Id.; see Amazon, supra notes 126-36; Napster,
supra notes 120-25; Grokster, supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text. The services of the
defendants here cannot be used to find infringing material, so Judge Smith asserts that involvement is
not established under any of those three cases either. Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 796. Judge Smith’s
reasoning here is based on his “reproduction, alteration, display and distribution” infringement list,
which oddly conflicts with the precedent cited just as much as it does with the pleadings of this case.
Id. Judge Kozinski points out that locating infringing images, like paying for them, also does not fit
into Judge Smith’s list. Id. at 814 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). This discrepancy casts more doubt on
strict adherence to Smith’s infringement definition.
191
Id. at 796. In other words, it’s possible the pirates’ sites could continue operating for free,
infringing Perfect 10’s copyright in substantially the same manner, only without the involvement of any
payment processors.
192
Id.
193
Id. at 796-97; see Napster, supra notes 120-25 and accompanying text. This is a rather loose
connection, especially after Judge Smith had distinguished the current case from Napster just three
sentences earlier. Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 796. By this logic, shouldn’t the defendants in Napster have
also been absolved of liability? After all, their users could have gone to pirate music on some other
file-sharing network; thus, the same infringement could have taken place without the involvement of the
defendants in Napster (the very existence of Grokster shows that alternatives were, indeed, available).
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He continues to reiterate that the defendants’ systems “in no way assist or enable
Internet users to locate infringing material, and they do not distribute it.”194 In
support, Judge Smith summarizes the Amazon holding (that having simple
measures available to prevent infringement and failing to take them satisfied
material contribution) and insists that this cannot be applied to payment systems as
it had for search engines.195 While admitting that the payments do provide
financial incentive, Judge Smith argues that this creates “an additional step in the
causal chain.”196 In this chain, the systems affect profitability, which affects
incentives for infringement, which affects infringement itself.197 This is contrasted
with the system in Amazon, which affects infringement directly.198
Aside from available alternatives for infringement, Judge Smith argues that
“other viable funding mechanisms are available” for the distributors’ operation as

Judge Smith’s argument here only seems to work in conjunction with his earlier argument that the
infringement is attached to the locality of distribution. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
Though an act of infringement may look the same to the end user no matter what network it occurs on,
if we think of infringement as tied to its locality, infringement on two different networks becomes
entirely separate. Under this line of thinking, we can think of the infringement in Napster as “Napsternetwork infringement” which indeed cannot occur without involvement of Napster’s defendants. Users
can still infringe elsewhere, but then it becomes “Grokster-network infringement” and so forth. Since
infringement, according to Judge Smith, is not tied to payment systems, we have no “Visa-network
infringement” which can be dissolved by removing involvement by Visa. Again, however, this is all
dependent on the notion that infringement does indeed attach where Judge Smith says it does. This
argument is revisited later by Judge Smith. See infra note 204.
194
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 797.
195
Id. It appears that Judge Smith wishes to distinguish between the recipients of infringing
material (who also pay money, in this case) and the suppliers of infringing material (who receive the
money here), given his rhetoric. See also id. at 799 (“Perfect 10’s images are easy to locate because of
the very nature of the Internet . . . Defendants play no role in any of these functions.” ). Search engines
principally benefit the infringing aims of to-be recipients whereas payment systems only represent a
hoop they might have to reluctantly jump through—it might be needed in order for them to get what
they want, but it’s not exactly a benefit to them. The real benefit of the money here goes to the
distributors—it’s the price they themselves have named. But why the distinction here? Judge Kozinski
calls this distinction “wishful thinking” and believes both should be considered material contributions.
Id. at 811 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Both the recipients and the distributors are direct infringers—why
does a benefit to one count as contributory while a benefit to the other does not? Indeed, this court held
in Amazon that search engine Google could be a contributory infringer because “Google substantially
assists websites to distribute their infringing copies to a worldwide market and assists a worldwide
audience of users to access infringing materials.” Amazon, 487 F.3d at 729 (emphasis added). The
court gives little reason to separate the two; Judge Kozinski describes their only support as consisting of
“disparaging use of ‘merely,’ ‘simply’ and ‘only.’” Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 812 (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting). Or does Judge Smith intend to mean that the payment systems do not “assist” either party?
If that were the case, then the phrase “financial assistance” must be a misnomer to Judge Smith.
196
Id. at 797.
197
Id.
198
Id. No authority is cited as to how many causal steps are sufficient to discharge a party from
liability, nor can any clues about this issue can be found in federal copyright statutes. In the dissenting
opinion, Judge Kozinski dismisses the “additional step” as unnecessary. Id. at 812 (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting). To him, “[m]ateriality turns on how significantly the activity helps infringement, not on
whether it’s characterized as one step or two steps removed from it.” Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 812.
Judge Kozinski appears to favor a broader application of liability, though he seems confident that it
would not create excess undue litigation in practice. Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 815 (“[C]ourts have shown
themselves adept at dealing with it from time out of mind, in resolving such issues as proximate
causation and reasonable suspicion”). The majority might even have been unable to reach a different
holding because of this fear. See id. at 798 n.9 (“We take little comfort in . . . a large number of
expensive and drawn-out pieces of litigation that may, or may not, ever be filed”).
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well, meaning that not only can the infringement still occur without the
defendants’ involvement,199 but it can be funded without the defendants’
involvement as well.200 In a footnote, Judge Smith also expresses concern that
allowing liability here would create a flood of “bogus notices to a credit card
company claiming infringement” and further discourage the business out of
general fear of litigation.201
199

See supra note 193.
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 797-98. As examples of alternatives for profits, Judge Smith suggests
advertising revenue and “other payment mechanisms that do not depend on the credit card companies.”
Id. Indeed, there are other ways of making payments online that do not use credit cards, with perhaps
the most prominent example being PayPal. See supra note 157. However, if alternative payment online
is “viable”, what is the meaning of the earlier recognition that “credit cards serve as the primary engine”
for Internet commerce? Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 794; see supra note 180 and accompanying text. If
they are so important for online transactions that protecting them is necessary to maintain a free market
online, then how effective can these alternative methods be? Judge Kozinski argues that the initial
policy recognition is correct—that “experience tells us . . . there are no adequate substitutes for credit
cards” or we must at least accept this fact as alleged by Perfect 10. Id. at 814 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
However, Kozinski also argues that the presence of alternatives is immaterial anyway. Id. (“It makes
no difference whether the primary infringers might do without it by finding a workaround”). Even
PayPal itself makes use of regular credit card processing. See supra note 157. If credit cards are just
one of many equally effective payment methods, there should be no worry that it requires sanctuary.
Judge Smith’s line of reasoning here is also inconsistent with Fonovisa, where swap meet
operators were still held liable despite the fact that alternative swap meets were available for vendors to
profit from selling pirated works. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264. Despite the possibility of alternatives in
Fonovisa, the court there still held that “it would be difficult for the infringing activity to take place in
the massive quantities alleged without the support services provided by the swap meet.” Id. Judge
Kozinski makes the same argument against Judge Smith with regards to Amazon. Perfect 10, 494 F.3d
at 812-13 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). There seems to be no shortage of cases where liability has applied
despite the presence of alternatives. Further, Judge Kozinski argues that the fabrication of possible
alternative methods of payment is a violation of procedure here, as it is contrary to Perfect 10’s
allegation that the infringers depend on Visa for their sales (and all allegations must be taken as true for
the purposes of a 12(b)(6) motion). Id. at 812 n.7, 813 (“we must work with the facts the parties
presented below, not invent new facts on appeal.”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
201
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 798 n.9. Judge Smith’s worries here have already been at issue with the
Internet economy (albeit in a slightly different sector of it) and already answered by Congress in the
form of the DMCA. 17 U.S.C. § 512(g); see supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text. Apparently
recognizing the potential for the very occurrence of “bogus notices,” § 512(g) could easily be applied to
protect companies like Visa by punishing frauds. The nature of their services’ uses over the Internet in
relation to the rest of the Internet should more than qualify them under the DMCA’s broad “service
provider” umbrella. See supra note 54. Other online payment services have already been included.
E.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 481 F.3d 751 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding DMCA service provider
status applied to middleman service which facilitated, for smaller merchants, use of major credit card
networks); Novotny v. Chapman, No. 3:05cv370, slip op. (W.D.N.C. 2006) (online fund-transfer
service PayPal is regarded as a DMCA service provider). While such examples are of services that are
wholly and exclusively online, Visa’s presence in the offline world probably would not disqualify them
for service provider status with regards to their online involvement. One can imagine that an Internet
service provider wouldn’t cease to be a DMCA service provider merely by branching off into nonInternet activities. Instead, the problem lies in the compliance with a DMCA take-down notice. See 17
U.S.C. § 512(g). As pointed out by Judge Smith earlier, credit card companies do not have the power to
take down infringing content after receiving a notice. Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 795 n.4. And while they
would still be open to injunctions under the DMCA, the injunction subsection provides no statutory
equivalent “grace period” of immunity in which a credit card company can act to prevent impending
litigation, rather than acting as a result of litigation and court order. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(j). Then
again, service of a subsection (j) injunction action itself could be seen as a take-down notice of sorts. If
a copyright holder threatens to injunctively force Visa to drop a merchant, the action dissolves if Visa
complies before any litigation begins and before any substantial legal fees accrue. But ideally,
congressional creation of a take-down-like procedure to precede subsection (j) action would be a
friendlier way of achieving the same result. Under this treatment, credit card companies need not worry
200
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Judge Smith again emphasizes his distinction between the location of
distribution and the location of payment.202 After summarizing the facts and
holdings of Fonovisa and Napster in greater detail, Judge Smith insists that it is the
“site and facilities” provided that created the liability; wholly different from the
current case.203 He uses this same concept to refute Perfect 10’s argument that the
defendants’ services “allow [infringement] to happen on a larger scale than would
otherwise be possible.”204 While Perfect 10 clearly wants Visa’s services to be
considered “site and facilities” in order to create the analogy to precedent, Judge
Smith sees this as an “extremely broad conception” which “appears to include any
tangible or intangible component related to any transaction in which infringing
material is bought and sold.”205 In Judge Smith’s view, accepting this conception
would improperly threaten too many “peripherally-involved third parties,”
including even computer manufacturers and electric utilities.206

about litigation until after they’ve received notice—they wouldn’t even need to pre-screen potential
merchants for infringing activity before approving them! For copyright holders, it would be a
standardized way to stop specific instances of infringement, which they already enjoy with regard to
other service providers.
202
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 798-99; see supra note 190.
203
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 798-99 (quoting Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264; Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022).
He further attempts to distinguish from Napster by noting the lack of intent by Visa: they didn’t set out
to create their payment system for the purposes of funding copyright infringement, unlike the
defendants in Napster who did. Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 799 n.10. Thus, the members of the majority
here “decline to radically expand Napster’s cursory treatment of ‘material contribution’ to cover a . . .
system that was not so designed.” Id. However, the court seems to have forgotten that they had done
that very thing, in the same year that this opinion was written, no less. Remember that in Amazon, even
though Google wasn’t held liable for vicarious infringement, the court did hold that Google could be
found liable for contributory infringement if knowledge could be established. Amazon, 487 F.3d at 729.
In fact, in that case, Google itself tried to make the argument that Judge Smith wants to make here: that
its system wasn’t created for use by infringers. Id. at 727. Furthermore, Google wanted to establish
that their system was capable of substantial non-infringing use under Sony. Id. (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at
442). The court held that this argument did not apply because Perfect 10’s claim (it was the plaintiff in
that action as well) was based on the effects of Google’s service, not of the service’s original design.
Amazon, 487 F.3d at 727. Here, too, Perfect 10’s complaint is not directed at Visa’s payment system
design, so the purpose of the design should not be a reason against material contribution here.
204
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 799. Judge Smith argues that making infringement profitable (as seen in
this case) is not the same as increasing infringement (as seen in Fonovisa) or making infringement
easier (as seen in Napster). Id. He also points out that the defendants here did not create a “centralized
place” for infringement as was seen in Napster and Fonovisa. Id. However, Judge Smith then states
that “[t]he provision of . . . accoutrements in Fonovisa was significant only because this was part of
providing the environment and market for counterfeit recording sales to thrive.” Id. This seems to
mean that the determination should really hinge on the ultimate effect of the actions in question to the
infringement in question, if indeed the actions themselves only matter to the extent that they make the
infringement prosper. Judge Smith might merely be speaking of the “centralized place” again when
saying “environment and market” but an environment or market need not be centralized. For instance,
the so-called “Black Market” is far from being a centralized place or operation; the same goes for
what’s known as the “job market”. The Third Circuit seems to have no such problem extending
liability “to the person who knowingly makes available other requisites” of infringement. Columbia
Pictures, 800 F.2d at 62 (reasoning that since an individual is liable by renting a video for the purposes
of unauthorized public performance, liability should also apply to those who provide other services
necessary for the public performance to happen).
205
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 799. Also on this page, Judge Smith reiterates his apparent distinction
between contribution to infringing distributors and contribution to infringing recipients. Id; see supra
note 195.
206
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 800. The favored construal seems to be limited to where Judge Smith
believes the heart of the infringements lay. See supra notes 190 and 195. This presumably stems from
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Judge Smith admits that Visa could “undermine the commercial viability of
infringement” by refusing service. However, Judge Smith refuses to see Visa as a
contributory infringer because of its lack of involvement with what he sees as the
direct infringement: “reproduction, alteration, display and distribution”—not
sale.207
Having found no material contribution, Judge Smith addresses inducement
next.208 Perfect 10 has argued that the defendants have induced their customers to
“use their cards to purchase goods and services,” which can include infringing
purchases.209 Thus, Perfect 10 alleged induced infringement under Grokster.210
However, Judge Smith reads Grokster as showing a much higher standard for
inducement, whereby a product or service is presented “with the object of
promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other
affirmative steps taken to foster infringement” and not merely promotion to use a
product or service in general, despite how some might use it.211 This can take the
form of active promotion of infringing capabilities of a product or service or it can
be found if “the article is good for nothing else but infringement,” in which case
the infringing capability may be too obvious to require promotion.212 Judge Smith
cites to Amazon as well for this principle.213 Since Perfect 10 had not alleged any
specific acts by the defendants or any other such “clear expression” to encourage
customers to use the cards for infringement, Judge Smith holds that inducement
has not been established.214 Thus, with material contribution and inducement held
insufficiently pled,215 the dismissal of Perfect 10’s contributory infringement claim
the main precedent cited for this case, which does not include actual credit card processors; rather, the
contributory infringers all seem to have something to do with distribution. Judge Smith makes it clear
in the text that he is very unwilling to let liability extend past what’s strictly seen in precedent. Perfect
10, 494 F.3d at 800.
207
Id. Again, we are left with no rationale for why “sale” isn’t regarded as one of the direct
infringements of this case, despite its inclusion in statute. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3); see also supra note 189.
208
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 800.
209
Id.
210
Id.
211
Id. In other words, it is like the difference between advertising a gun’s ability to carry out
murder as opposed to merely advertising the physical features of a gun.
212
Id. at 801. The former was clearly seen in Grokster, where defendants “explicitly targeted thencurrent users of the Napster program” to use their network for piracy instead. Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at
801. (citing Grokster, 545 U.S. at 925-26). In contrast, the latter route is reminiscent of Sony: had the
VTRs been found to have no other use than piracy, the “significant noninfringing use” idea would have
never come into play to save them. See Sony, supra notes 81-87.
213
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 801-02. Amazon’s inclusion is quite passive, though it is indeed
consistent with Grokster. The Amazon court “did recognize that contributory liability ‘may be
predicated on actively encouraging (or inducing) infringement through specific acts.’” Id. at 801
(quoting Amazon, 487 F.3d at 726).
214
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 801-02. This appears to be a correct reading and application of
inducement. Even with Visa’s knowledge of the infringement and their continued promotion of card
use, this promotion is far too general to show that Visa wanted to encourage the infringement in
particular. However, Judge Smith’s affinity to the recipient-centric view of infringement remains
apparent in this analysis. See supra note 195. In the inducement discussion, Judge Smith only speaks
of how Visa treated its cardholders with regards to infringement promotion. Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at
801-02. Though the result should hardly be different from Visa’s inducement of merchants, that
relationship is completely absent from Judge Smith’s analysis.
215
And with causation and knowledge of infringement essentially ignored (the former presumably
not pled; the latter unnecessary to discuss given other holdings).
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is affirmed.216
Judge Smith covers the vicarious infringement claim in the next section of
the opinion.217 He briefly recites the history and then the rule: “(1) the right and
ability to supervise the infringing conduct and (2) a direct financial interest in the
infringing activity.”218 Judge Smith also takes note of an “alternate formulation”
by the Supreme Court: “‘profiting from direct infringement while declining to
exercise a right to stop or limit it.’”219
The supervision prong is addressed first.220 Here, Judge Smith notes that
Visa has a set of rules regulating the conduct of member banks, including a
prohibition on “providing services to merchants engaging in certain illegal
activities” if such is discovered through investigation.221 However, Judge Smith
maintains that the ability to enforce these rules does not equate to the right and
ability to control the infringers.222 He draws similarity with Amazon, where
Google’s abilities to avoid indexing infringers and to remove infringers from the
Google advertising system were deemed insufficient for demonstrating a right of
control over infringement.223 Like Google, writes Judge Smith, Visa can limit
infringement, but “the mere ability to withdraw a financial ‘carrot’ does not create
the ‘stick’ . . . that vicarious infringement requires.”224
Judge Smith sees the defendant’s ability to control in Napster as far more
related to the relevant infringement than that in this case.225 Specifically, Judge
216

Id. at 795.
Id. at 802.
218
Id. (citing Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1078; Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022).
219
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 802 (quoting Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930).
220
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 802. In a note, Judge Smith reflects two courts’ views on “supervision”
with regard to vicarious infringement, presumably to give foundation for his own view. Id. n.13 (“the
swap meet operator’s ability to control the activities of the vendors” in Fonovisa; “Napster’s ability to
police activities of its users” in Napster). Id.
221
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 802-03.
222
Id. at 803. Judge Smith also concedes that the direct infringement, defendants’ knowledge of it,
and defendants’ ability to cease processing were “adequately pled” by Perfect 10. Id.
223
Id. (citing Amazon, 487 F.3d at 730-32). However this holding was particularly targeted at the
control exercised through Google’s advertising program. See id. Though Google’s control over its
index listing was not found to be sufficient either, no analysis was given by the Amazon court about
what kind of indexing factors might qualify to establish the supervision needed (e.g., if Google’s index
happened to be the sole means of accessing the infringing websites). Id..
224
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 803. The analogy to Amazon is very weak, though. While Google’s
advertising program is the sole source of income for many websites, there were no facts indicating that
this was the case for the sites at issue in Amazon. Visa’s network plays a far more prominent role in the
infringing businesses here than Google’s index or ad program did in Amazon. Judge Smith thinks that
finding vicarious liability here “would also require a finding that Google is vicariously liable” but that’s
not necessarily the case. Id. In Amazon, the other prong for vicarious liability (financial benefit) was
not evaluated at all. Amazon, 487 F.3d at 731 n.15. Furthermore, the clear distinction in magnitude of
impact should be enough to make these situations independent of the same holding.
225
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 803. The two are far more similar than Judge Smith describes, however.
He repeats yet again the difference in distribution as opposed to payment, which has no bearing on a
right to control issue. Id. at 803-04. He further lists Napster’s powers as the “ability to block user
access to its program and thereby deprive particular users of access to their forum” yet does not state
how this is different from Visa. Id. at 804. Visa can block merchants from its payment network and
therefore deprive access to their forum of business. While it is true that other credit card networks or
payment methods might be utilized instead and also true that the infringers could continue to distribute
the material free of charge, any blocked Napster user could have switched to a different network or
217
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Smith believes that Visa’s power “does not extend to directly stopping [infringing]
violations themselves” while Napster’s did.226 Besides this, Judge Smith also
writes that “indirect economic pressure” is not enough to constitute the requisite
control, at least in Visa’s case.227
found some other way to exchange pirated material—yet, that did not stop a finding for vicarious
infringement by the Napster court.
226
Id. Judge Smith argues that Visa is limited because they can not “block access to the Internet”
or to any particular sites or search engines. Id. But Napster could not block Internet access either. See
also id. at 813 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“The majority’s claim that search engines ‘could effectively
cause a website to disappear’ . . . is quite a stretch”). Judge Smith says Napster was able to “block . . .
violation of the distribution right” but that is not entirely accurate. Id. at 804 n.14. Rather, what they
were really blocking was the distribution right with regards to their own service. This amount of
control is quite diminished from Judge Smith’s description, though it does not necessarily mean Napster
should have escaped vicarious liability. Even though no singular file-sharing service has the power to
completely bar users from piracy (because users can always switch to an alternate service), the entire
body of services, together, can. Each service does have the power to make itself uninvolved. And one
which chooses to stay involved exposes itself to liability. If each service chooses to avoid this risk, then
there are no more services for the user to turn to. Only in that situation of group action do we have
anything close to blocking global distribution in the meaningful sense; but it starts at the individual
provider level. Like Napster, Visa’s power is indeed weak, but this should not preclude a finding of
sufficient control because the real control only manifests in the broader picture. See also id. at 817
(Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“[C]ourts have presumed that removing the particular means of infringement
challenged in each case would . . . diminish the [overall] scale of infringing activity”) (emphasis added).
Judge Smith insists that “absolute right to stop the infringement” is not an actual requirement for
right and ability to control. Id. at 805 n.16. This appears to be exactly what he wants to require of
Visa, however. See, e.g., id. at 806 n.18 (Perfect 10 does not allege “that the websites would
completely vanish or that infringement by these sites in all its forms would necessarily cease”). Again,
while its control is limited, it holds the same type of individual power seen in Napster, which blossoms
when applied more broadly. If we instead assume that Judge Smith does not actually intend that, then
we must believe his alternative argument, premised on his oft-used idea that only the reproduction,
distribution, and availability of the pirated materials count as the infringement. Id. Thus, Visa’s control
over the payment aspect is not control of one of the “tools needed” for infringement as defined by Judge
Smith. Id. at 804 n.15. The ability to receive payment certainly is a tool of sale, however. Yet sale, an
enumerated exclusive right under statute, remains neglected by Judge Smith’s analysis. See 17 U.S.C. §
106(3) (2002).
227
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 805. While refusing service would be an exercise of Visa’s contractual
rights with its merchants, Judge Smith asserts that the reduction would come only from the economic
threat rather than the use of the contract. Id. at 804, 805. However, this is not true given the procedures
Visa has in place to combat infringers, criminals, and other unwanted parties. See infra note 271.
There are plenty of measures available preceding actual refusal of service which are quite similar to the
swap meet’s regulatory measures in Fonovisa and the overall practical effect is identical. At least one
prior case has even treated attempts to prevent infringement as establishment of control. Warner Bros.,
Inc. v. Lobster Pot, Inc., 582 F.Supp. 478, 483 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (“[T]he fact that the defendant told his
manager to instruct people not to play copyrighted music is indicative of Defendant Haffey's right and
ability to control”). See also Chess Music, Inc. v. Sipe, 442 F.Supp. 1184, 1185 (D.C. Minn. 1977)
(finding requisite control where “[t]he defendant ha[d] a choice as to whether he will have [infringing]
live music or do without, and has chosen to profit thereby”).
Apparently sensing further misunderstanding of his opinion, Judge Smith makes clear that
financial pressure is not per se insufficient control. Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 807 n.17. Indeed, financial
pressure appeared to be at least one of the main factors under the vicarious infringement evaluation in
Fonovisa. But Judge Smith states here that Visa’s particular ability to financially pressure is not “the
sort” that the court would extend liability to, for reasons of policy. Id. This policy consideration is the
same as appears in Judge Smith’s earlier remarks: that liability should be limited here because we
would otherwise be endangering parties even further removed from the incidents. See supra note 201
and accompanying text. If that is indeed the real reason why Judge Smith doesn’t see Visa’s financial
pressure as sufficient, then there is hardly need for this holding anymore. Such parties are easily
protected by clever systems of law that have already been in place for decades. Judge Smith also argues
that the mere ability to refuse service should not be used to implicate any of these parties. Perfect 10,
494 F.3d at 805 n.17. Congress seems to think otherwise, however; as evidenced by the DMCA and its
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At the end of the section, Judge Smith describes Visa as just one of many
entities necessary for the acts of the direct infringers while also receiving profit.228
He even admits that Visa possesses “literal power to ‘stop or limit’ the
infringement,” yet this is still not sufficient because the power does not stem
precisely from the infringing acts.229
Given the insufficiency held for right to control, the court declined to address
the financial interest element.230 The court held that the defendants did not have
the right and ability to control the direct infringers; thus, the district court’s
decision to dismiss Perfect 10’s claim for vicarious infringement of copyright was
affirmed.231
In the final sections of Judge Smith’s opinion, contributory and vicarious
trademark infringement were both analyzed, as were some claims under
Californian state law.232 The dismissals for each of these claims were also
safe harbor, which clearly anticipate and temper this kind of result. See 17 U.S.C. § 512.
228
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 806.
229
Id. In other words, Visa does have influence over the infringement, but only through sales that
are incidental to the infringing acts; the influence and control, according to Judge Smith, must come
through the acts themselves. Id. at 804. But again, this only works if we defy the legislation and deny
that unauthorized sale of copyrighted works is infringement. If Judge Smith would remember § 106(3),
he could see that Visa’s power does indeed arise directly from one particular, enumerated protection:
sale. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3); see also Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 814 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Furthermore,
we can look to the intent of respondeat superior, upon which vicarious infringement is based. The idea
is to reduce and/or properly compensate tortious acts; employers and principals are made liable for
compensation simply because it is in their power to reduce the occurrence of these torts. See Lisa M. v.
Henry Mayo Newhall Mem’l Hosp., 907 P.2d 358 (Cal. 1995). The manner of this power is decentral
to the thrust of respondeat superior—all that matters is that the extension of liability encourages
reduction of torts by those who can reduce them; and that those same parties are made available as
defendants to better insure that tort victims are made whole. See id. The Grokster language is quite
compatible with this: “One . . . infringes vicariously by profiting from direct infringement while
declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it.” Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930. Visa fits this handsomely:
Judge Smith himself recognizes Visa’s ability to at least reduce these infringements; and the resulting
profits received are undisputed by the defendants.
230
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 806. Defendants do not dispute this element and Visa’s system is
described as generating profit from every transaction, with no facts or allegations to indicate that
transactions from the infringing sites were exempt from this. In the dissent, Judge Kozinski asserts that
“[t]here is no doubt that defendants profit from the infringing activity” due to the nature of the payment
system. Id. at 816 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citing First Amended Complaint at 4 and 7, Perfect 10,
Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 05-15170)). Even if the fee for Visa’s
services is very low, it’s sufficient that money comes from customers who are purchasing infringing
materials. Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1078-79 (clarifying that Fonovisa did not create a “requirement that the
draw be ‘substantial’”); see, e.g., Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 308 (defendant “had a most definite financial
interest” when it received “10% or 12% of the sales price of every record sold . . . whether ‘bootleg’ or
legitimate”); Polygram Int’l Publ’g, Inc. v. Nevada/TIG, Inc., 855 F.Supp. 1314 (D. Mass. 1994) (trade
show participants received direct financial benefit from infringing use of background music at the
show).
231
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 802.
232
Id. at 806-10. As these claims are outside of the scope of this article, their analysis will only be
reviewed briefly here. While copyright and trademark law share a “kinship” of commonality, their
differences are important to recognize. Sony, 464 U.S. at 439 (1984). Trademark law protects
registered marks of businesses from unauthorized use, confusion, or dilution by similar or identical
marks used by other parties. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 et seq. For contributory trademark infringement,
one must show inducement to infringe trademark or knowing supply of an infringing/mislabeled
product to a direct infringer. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982). According to
Judge Smith, Perfect 10 did not plead facts for inducement or for the supply of the right type of
instrumentality. Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 807. For vicarious trademark infringement, one must show
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affirmed.233
B. The Dissenting Opinion
Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski dissents from the majority “for the most
part.”234 He begins the dissenting opinion with his own brief narrative of the facts,
emphasizing the fact that this case is essentially the final avenue Perfect 10 may
use to protect their copyright and other interests.235 In a note, Judge Kozinski
makes clear that most of his dissent specifically refers to member bank defendants,
rather than the Visa network itself, where any defendants are mentioned.236 He
also notes at the outset that the defendants here might even qualify as direct
infringers of copyright, though such was not actually pleaded by Perfect 10.237
Judge Kozinski argues similarity with Amazon for contributory infringement:
that the defendants here run a payment system rather than a search engine and all
other facts match.238 The focus is straightforward: Judge Kozinski’s idea of
contributory liability is based on the significance of contribution in any form.239
Applied to Amazon and this case, “[i]f infringing images can’t be found, there can
be no infringement; but if infringing images can’t be paid for, there can be no
infringement either.”240 While the majority is adamant in their distinctions
“apparent or actual partnership . . . authority to bind one another in transactions . . . or exercise[d] joint
ownership or control over the infringing product.” Hard Rock Cafe, 955 F.2d at 1150. Judge Smith
saw the Visa-infringer relationship as insufficiently strong enough to qualify for this claim. Perfect 10,
494 F.3d at 808. Perfect 10’s basis for its California state claims for unfair competition and false
advertising were based on unusable authority. Id. at 809. Its California state claim for violation to right
of publicity also lacked authority. Id. Its California state claims for libel and intentional interference
with prospective economic advantage were barred by statutes of limitation. Id. at 810.
233
Id..
234
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 810 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Specifically, Judge Kozinski disagreed
with the majority’s opinion and decision for all claims except for the two time-barred state law claims.
Id. n.1.
235
Id. at 810. This is because the direct infringers are abroad and out of reach and the defendants
refuse to comply with Perfect 10’s requests to halt service to the direct infringers. Id.
236
Id. at 811 n.2. This is probably because the member banks are the entities that interact most
closely with the infringing merchants, though Judge Kozinski also notes that liability among individual
defendants “is a matter to be sorted out after discovery” and not truly an issue at this point in the case.
Id.
237
Id. n.3. The majority seems to find this idea shocking. See, e.g., id. at 797 n.6 (dissent’s
language “suggests that the dissent believes that the Defendants are directly infringing when they
process these payments”) (emphasis in original); id. at 800 n.11 (if dissent’s argument is correct, “it is
difficult to see why Defendants would be not be [sic] direct infringers of the distribution right”)
(emphasis in original). Judge Kozinski points out, however, that it is possible for one party to be
simultaneously liable of both direct and indirect infringement. Id. at 811 n.3 (citing Alcatel USA, In. v.
DGI Technologies, Inc., 166 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 1999)).
238
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 811 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). And for these purposes, Judge Kozinski
believes that payment systems and search engines are also the same. Id. at 811-12. The majority
protests this argument, insisting that a search engine’s actions are material contributions because they
assist the recipient-user, while credit card processing does not. Id. at 797. Judge Kozinski calls it
“wishful thinking” to think that only the search engine substantially assists infringement. Id. at 811
(Kozinski, J., dissenting).
239
Id. at 812
240
Id. Under this test, “[l]ocation services and payment services are equally central to
infringement” with no further distinction. Id. (emphasis added). An inequality wouldn’t remove a
lesser service either. Id. n.6 (“[T]his is not a race where there can be only one winner”).
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between types of infringement aid, Judge Kozinski points out that relevant
authority in their favor is nonexistent.241
As to Judge Smith’s classification of sale as non-infringement,242 Judge
Kozinski makes two arguments.243 First, he points out that sale is indeed an
infringement, both alleged and enumerated in statute.244 Second, he demonstrates
that the “reproduction, alteration, display [or] distribution” definition, used by
Judge Smith to exclude Visa in the majority opinion,245 also excludes the
defendant in Amazon, where infringement was not dismissed.246
Judge Kozinski also argues analogy with Fonovisa, in that the online
marketplace maintained by Visa much resembles the swap meet environment,
including the consequences of service denial available to both.247 He then bolsters
his material contribution argument by drawing analogies to other crimes:
If you lend money to a drug dealer knowing he will use it to finance a drug deal,
you materially assist the transaction, even if you never see the drugs. . . . [I]f you
knowingly drive a principal to the scene of the crime, you provide material
assistance, even if nothing happens during the ride.248

Judge Kozinski writes that the significance of contribution test automatically
guards against litigation of excess defendants, thus eliminating a major roadblock
between the majority and a decision in favor of Perfect 10.249 Kozinski also
encourages use of the older landlord-tenant and dance hall models of precedent as
standards for additional significance testing.250
241

Id. at 813.
Or, more accurately, Judge Smith’s failure to classify sale as infringement. See supra notes 189,
207 and accompanying text.
243
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 814 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
244
Id.; see 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2002).
245
See Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 796.
246
Id. at 814 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).; see Amazon, supra notes 126-36 and accompanying text.
247
Id. at 814-15. In fact, Judge Kozinski argues that the “assistance provided here” goes even
further than it did in Fonovisa, because Visa’s network reaches far more of the Internet than a single
swap meet could reach in the brick-and-mortar world. Id. at 815.
248
Id. (citing United States v. Lopez, 482 F.3d 1067, 1076-79 (9th Cir. 2007)).
249
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 815 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Judge Kozinski explains that such a test
fits in easily among routine evaluations by courts, which are already designed to sort through many
defendants connected by cause-in-fact. Id.; see supra notes 201, 206 and accompanying text.
250
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 815-16 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Judge Smith protests the use of these
prior lines of cases, asserting that it was “developed for a brick-and-mortar world, and . . . do not lend
themselves well to application in an electronic commerce context.” Id. at 798 n.9. Smith uses Napster
and Grokster (two Supreme Court cases which evaluated contributory infringement but did not utilize
the landlord/dancehall precedent) as support for this proposition. Id.; see also Napster, supra notes
120-25; Grokster, supra note 88-96. However, as Judge Kozinski points out, those tests were
inapplicable to both Napster and Grokster, as their systems were created for the express purpose of
piracy. Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 816 n.10 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Since the defendants’ relationship to
the infringement was far more obvious in those two cases, there was no gray area requiring a
landlord/dancehall distinction. Id. Though new technology may tempt judges to replace old standards,
it seems the Supreme Court has urged carefulness in displacing older law. See Grokster, supra note 91
(Supreme Court did not want the newer Sony standard to displace the older precedent). Judge Kozinski
also points to a Seventh Circuit case decided subsequent to Napster and Grokster which used the
landlord/dancehall determination. Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 816 n.10 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citing In
re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 654 (7th Cir. 2003)).
242
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In the next section of the dissent, Judge Kozinski addresses the vicarious
infringement claim, using the Grokster phrasing of the rule: “profiting from direct
infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it.”251 He declares
that the profit element is already met252 and then moves on to the “stop or limit”
requirement.253 Using Amazon, Judge Kozinski takes this as meaning both a legal
right and a practical ability.254
Judge Kozinski notes that Visa’s member-bank regulations describe
procedures for responding to illegal activity such as infringement.255 Thus, the
defendants reserve contractual power to demand cessation of infringement, with
threat of exclusion as their ultimate means of enforcement.256 Judge Kozinski
argues that this matches Fonovisa, where the defendants’ power and enforcement
were identical to what was described here.257 He disputes the majority’s need for
Visa to be able to stop infringement beyond their own networks; Judge Kozinski is
convinced that the defendants here have the same “practical ability” to stop or limit
infringement as seen in Fonovisa and Amazon.258 Again, Judge Kozinski stresses
that the availability of alternatives is immaterial to this issue, as alternatives were
also available in every other case where vicarious infringement was found.259
Judge Kozinski does not see credit card processing as being merely a small part of

251
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 816 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (quoting Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930)
(internal quotation marks omitted). This is the same as the “alternate formulation” rule quoted by the
majority. Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 802.
252
Judge Smith did not address this element. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
253
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 816 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
254
Id. n.11.
255
Id. at 816.
256
Id. at 817. Two notes by Judge Kozinski examine credit card internal rules in more detail. See
id. at 816 n.12; id. at 817 n.13. The majority also argues that the defendants here need to “supervise
and control” (the dissent’s statement of the rule does not phrase it that way), but even that requirement
seems met by the imposition and enforcement of rules—in the end, they are as good as any other
contractual provision. Id. at 805.
257
Id. at 817 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Recall that in Fonovisa, the swap meet had rules for
vendors and contractual provisions allowing them to make demands of vendors, with threat of removal
as their power of enforcement. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 263.
258
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 817-18 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Though Judge Smith expressly denies
using the higher standard, Judge Kozinski insists that the majority is exaggerating the requirements set
in precedent. Id. at 818 n.15. He points out that the majority expressly rejected “practical ability”
despite Amazon. Id. at 817 n.16; see also id. at 805 n.17. And, going by the majority’s contention that
the absence of an absolute right is evidence against vicarious infringement, Judge Kozinski argues that
the issue should thus be developed in discovery and later stages of litigation. Id. at 818 n.15 (Kozinski,
J., dissenting).
Though the majority harps on the fact that Amazon held against vicarious infringement for
Google, Judge Kozinski distinguishes that evaluation because it was presented on a preliminary
injunction with stricter standards against plaintiffs than the motion to dismiss here. Id. at 821.
Furthermore, Judge Kozinski reminds us that Google lacked any contractual agreement with sites
indexed on its image-search service (contracts were involved in their advertising program, but
constituted a separate, peripheral enterprise). Id. at 820. Thus, Google had hardly any of the leverage
against infringers we see here. Id.
259
Id. The power here lies in the power of refusal to do business, an ability which Judge Smith
deemed insufficient. Id. at 805. Judge Kozinski interprets the precedent as indicating that the refusal of
service need only disinvolve the direct infringer from the defendant’s particular sphere of control,
thereby reducing infringement in the aggregate. Id. at 817 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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this infringement business, either.260 Rather, he argues that credit cards were
originally chosen as the infringers’ “preferred means of doing business”—thus,
forcing infringers to use an alternative results in discouragement of infringement
because it forces them to infringe in a less-preferred manner.261
Judge Kozinski notes many ways that refusal of service could “stop or limit”
infringement, including bankruptcy and the loss of customers who are unwilling to
use an alternative system.262 He argues that even the majority’s description of the
defendants’ potential influence meets the “stop or limit” requirement:263 “fear of
losing access to credit card payment processing services would be a sufficient
incentive for at least some website operators to comply with . . . Defendants.”264
Finally, Judge Kozinski attacks the majority for distinguishing Napster and
Grokster.265 While Judge Smith wrote that Visa isn’t as “directly intertwined”
with infringement as the defendants in Napster, Judge Kozinski is adamant that it
is.266 He argues that payment processing is easily a major element in any other
crime267 and also an effective means of stopping infringement.268 Judge Kozinski
suggests that the majority didn’t adopt Grokster only because they feared that too
many parties would be swept into vicarious infringement actions.269
260

Id. at 817-18.
Id. There are no indications of what the pirates’ actual decision-making process was, however,
nor of what their next highest preference was. Judge Kozinski seems to infer that credit cards were the
top choice simply because it’s what the pirates ultimately chose. Id. Judge Kozinski also remarks that
credit card features such as dispute resolution support and processing speed also directly benefit
purchasers of infringing material. Id. at 817; see also id. at 818 (“[H]ow many consumers would be
willing to send a check or money order to a far-off jurisdiction in the hope that days or weeks later they
will be allowed to download some saucy pictures?”). Thus, the recipients have particular interest in
keeping the services of the defendants.
262
Id. at 818-19. Kozinski states that the customers might even be compelled to purchase
membership from Perfect 10’s site, whose support from Visa would not be barred by infringing
activities. Id. at 819 n.17.
263
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 819.
264
Id. at 804.
265
Id. at 821 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
266
Id.
267
Id. Again, Judge Kozinski draws analogy to a drug deal here, where “we would never say that
the guy entrusted with delivery of the purchase money is less involved in the transaction than the guy
who helps find the seller.” Id. Judge Smith would argue that the money courier is less involved than
someone who is both a money and drug courier (the latter possesses the distribution role which the
majority argues is required by precedent), once again making the distribution/sale distinction. See
supra notes 190, 195 and accompanying text. One blogger notes that the reason credit card companies
seem to rarely be involved in other illegal activities is because of the paper trail created. Susan Scafidi,
Of Credit Cards and Counterfeits, COUNTERFEIT CHIC, July 9, 2007, http://www.counterfeitchic.com/
2007/07/of_credit_cards_and_counterfeits.php (commenting on the Perfect 10 decision in general).
However, Judge Kozinski seems to be arguing that the money-handling alone is more than enough and
that we’re trying to determine whether things pass a threshold, not which of two things is more.
268
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 821. He even remarks that financial pressure is even “sometimes more
effective, than technical measures that can often be circumvented.” Id. Judge Kozinski also claims that
“financial support has long been held to be a basis for vicarious infringement,” though he only cites to
one example outside of this jurisdiction. Id. n.21 (citing Davis v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 240
F.Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)).
269
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 821-22. Here, Judge Kozinski argues that the contractual right is what
sets Visa apart from other possible defendants such as computer manufacturers, whose contracts grant
virtually no leverage against a criminal after the criminal has purchased a computer. Id. Thus, there
should be no worry of excess litigation and Grokster is otherwise quite applicable.
261
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In the final sections of his dissent, Judge Kozinski argues that the trademark
claims and state law claims were also properly pleaded, using much the same
reasoning as he did for the copyright claims.270 He concludes that credit card
companies simply need to be held responsible while knowingly aiding and
profiting from infringement; that they’ve already taken measures against other
crimes and could easily do the same to help protect copyright.271
V.

IMPACT OF PERFECT 10 V. VISA

A. Generally
Perfect 10 draws a bold line which secondary copyright liability cannot cross
in the Ninth Circuit, perhaps in disagreement with what the Ninth Circuit has said
before.272 Amid the vast, growing landscape of Internet piracy and flying
speculations on who will next be bitten by an RIAA lawsuit, Perfect 10 blocks
liability for an entire class of defendants. Credit card companies are now able to
operate with fewer worries and fewer obligations with regard to controlling the
conduct of merchants they deal with.
There could be general advantages as a result of this decision. If the
majority is to be believed, this affirmation of freedom for credit card companies
will foster rigorous growth and development of the Internet economy and the
Internet itself.273 Furthermore, the majority believes that this limitation on liability
will allow many entities peripherally involved in copyright infringement to breathe
easier and continue business without fear of litigation.274 Less litigation of this
sort will be seen in the Ninth Circuit because of the newfound protection for this
type of defendant. If the dissent is to be believed, the court has just allowed a
significant partner in copyright infringement to escape responsibility,275 while
copyright holders are unjustly limited from protecting their assets.276

270

Id. at 822-23. These claims are outside the scope of this article.
Id. at 824.
272
And this jurisdiction is not to be taken lightly either, as a significant portion of the technology
and media industries of this country call the Ninth Circuit home.
273
See Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 794. And indeed, the court has been lauded for this very reason.
One intellectual property lawyer described the decision as “a pro-commerce, pro-Internet decision that
could have slowed down commerce significantly if it had gone the other way.” Julius Melnitzer, Porn
Site Loses High Stakes, INSIDECOUNSEL, Sept. 2007 (internal quotations omitted), available at
http://www.insidecounsel.com/section/litigation/1369.
274
See Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 798 n.9. One blogger agrees with this, applauding the decision
which otherwise “would have opened potentially endless claims of liability against a wide range of
potential defendants who simply do business with infringers.” Alfred Yen, Ninth Circuit Affirms
Dismissal in Perfect 10 v. Visa, MADISONIAN.NET, July 9, 2007, http://madisonian.net/archives/2007/
07/09/ninth-circuit-affirms-dismissal-in-perfect-10-v-visa/.
275
See Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 821 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). In the wake of the decision, Perfect
10 is, of course, unhappy. Its founder, Norm Zada, described this turn of events as a “horrible blow”
against “the victims of massive intellectual property theft . . . .” Dawn C. Chmielewski, Credit Card
Firms Not on Hook for Piracy, L.A. TIMES, July 4, 2007, available at http://msl1.mit.edu/furdlog/docs/
latimes/2007-07-04_latimes_perfect10_decision.pdf.
276
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d. at 810.
271
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B. Impact on Ninth Circuit Law
As discussed in the analysis of the majority’s opinion, Perfect 10 has
committed grave errors in failing to recognize “sale” as a means of
infringement,277 not to mention its overstated fears of excessive future litigation278
and unpersuasive attempts to distinguish Visa from past defendants.279 The dissent
also argues that this decision represents a massive departure from prior, even
recent, precedent.280 The sentiment is echoed throughout the intellectual property
blogosphere, which seems to point at all three Perfect 10 cases of 2007 as being
problematic for this area of law.281 This could be the cause for confusion in future
cases, which must reconcile this new line that the majority has drawn between
distribution and payment;282 a line which the dissent finds arbitrary and
unsupported.283 Other circuits may side with the dissent here and forge their own
standards in conflict with the Ninth Circuit majority, though they will undoubtedly
see fewer cases of this sort in their jurisdictions. Even the Ninth Circuit, which is
now technically bound by this decision, may find reason to abandon the Perfect 10
reasoning after all, or find reason to forever distinguish it. A significant majority
of legal commentators have come out in support of Judge Kozinski’s dissent over
the majority’s shaky argumentation,284 with one blog even giving the dissent a
“runner-up” prize for the “Best Legal Decision” of 2007.285 Another openly calls
for the Ninth Circuit to re-evaluate their entire line of precedent; to “bite the bullet
and wipe those cases (and their progeny) off the books. Otherwise, the Ninth
Circuit will torture itself each time it tries to reconcile new opinions with those
erroneous opinions.”286 Perhaps more practical advice for intellectual property
lawyers is to be quite aware of the strong arguments made in Kozinski’s dissent—

277

See supra notes 189, 207 and accompanying text.
See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
279
See, e.g., supra note 193.
280
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d. at 814 (“The majority makes some very new—and very bad—law here”).
281
E.g., Crawford, supra note 179 (“The Amazon standard is a swamp, which isn’t great news for
the internet ecosystem”); Eric Goldman, Credit Card Providers Aren’t Liable for Third Party
Infringement—Perfect 10 v. Visa, TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG, July 9, 2007, http://blog.ericgoldman.org/
archives/2007/07/credit_card_providers.htm (“In contrast, wading through the details shows just how
problematic Ninth Circuit cyberlaw jurisprudence has become. The Ninth Circuit has chunked a few
major Internet cases—Napster and Brookfield are two conspicuous examples—which has produced a
long list of tortured subsequent precedent.”); Rebecca Tushnet, Visa: It’s Everywhere You Want to
Infringe, 43(B)LOG, July 4, 2007, http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2007/07/visa-its-everywhere-you-wantto.html (“[B]ut I’m inclined to see that as a problem with Perfect 10 v. Google rather than a problem
with this ruling.”).
282
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d. at 796; see supra notes 190, 195 and accompanying text.
283
E.g., Perfect 10, 494 F.3d. at 811 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
284
See, e.g., Crawford, supra note 179 (“Kozinski’s reasoning may be persuasive.”); Tushnet,
supra note 280 (“Kozinski’s dissent does a pretty good job of pointing out the thinness of the
distinctions required.”); Eugene Volokh, Are Credit Card Providers Liable for Knowingly Facilitating
Sales of Infringing Material?, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, July 3, 2007, http://volokh.com/posts/
1183485027.shtml (“Kozinski’s opinion is more persuasive as a matter of current law.”).
285
J. Craig Williams, 2007 Legal News: The Third Annual Legal Louie Awards, MAY IT PLEASE
THE COURT LAW WEBLOG, Dec. 31, 2007, http://www.mayitpleasethecourt.com/journal.asp?
blogid=1703.
286
Goldman, supra note 281.
278
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though dicta, it certainly holds persuasive weight.287 The Californian courts may
have already been acting in line with Kozinski, at least with regard to the state law
claims that later appeared in Perfect 10.288 Time will tell whether the majority
opinion actually holds weight in federal practice.
It is also possible that Congress will amend the DMCA to specifically
include online credit card processors as service providers,289 thereby affording the
processors a protective procedure and a clearer delineation of liability.290 Clarity
in this area of the law is very much needed from Congress, if the courts are unable
to agree.
C. Online Payment Processors
Credit card companies like Visa and other online payment services operating
in the Ninth Circuit can rejoice. For now. Though the Ninth Circuit has
essentially given carte blanche to payment processors with regards to merchants
who infringe copyright, a district court may not take Perfect 10 so seriously. Or it
may construe the majority’s confusing reasoning in Perfect 10 in an unpredictable
manner, finding that the particular circumstances perhaps warrant liability for a
payment processor that differs from Visa in minute ways. Lastly, a district court
may simply like Kozinski’s dissent better, as many readers have, and swiftly
impose liability on a defendant who didn’t see it coming. The best advice for
payment processors is to realize that they may not be out of the woods just yet. Be
well-versed with Judge Kozinski’s arguments if you’re served with process for
secondary copyright liability.291 Safer still, listen to legitimate complaints about
infringing conduct by your member merchants—if anything, it is a good publicrelations move to deny support for those who profit from illegal activity.292 After
all, as seen in Perfect 10, the complainant at your door might even be another
member merchant of yours293 who needs your help.
D. Copyright Holders
If your income derives substantially from exclusive control over your
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copyrighted works, this decision hurts for you. Under the Perfect 10 holding,
offshore pirates of content are free to profit from the unauthorized online
distribution of your works. Due to jurisdictional problems, you can’t sue them
directly. Due to Perfect 10, you can’t go after their payment systems in order to
stop their flow of money. However, you do have supporters on your side,
including at least one adamant Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge. They may
very well change the landscape of the Ninth Circuit’s treatment and make it viable
again to sue credit card companies as secondary infringers. But for now, it may
prove more successful to litigate in another venue where the Perfect 10 majority
isn’t binding and where the Perfect 10 dissent may find open ears. Try litigating
from a standpoint of the DMCA’s injunction provisions,294 where you need only
show that the defendant is a qualified service provider and can limit the
infringement by banning a particular member of their service.295
Concerned parties and their respective interest groups may also want to
lobby Congress for an extension of the DMCA. If Congress were to include a
specific take-down procedure for entities such as payment processors, protection of
one’s copyright interests against these offshore pirates can be achieved in a simple,
standardized process. Copyright holders may already be used to exercising this
type of procedure when their work appears unauthorized on a user-submission site
like YouTube.296
VI. CONCLUSION
In Perfect 10 v. Visa, the court upheld secondary liability for distribution
services that aided copyright infringement but refused to allow this liability to
extend to payment processing services used by infringers. While the majority
rightly charged itself with the duty to define limits for secondary liability, it may
have drawn this line too short of where it should be. The key distinctions made
appear to be based in naïveté, speculation, and selective ignorance. And though
legitimate concerns also formed this decision, the majority seems to analyze
precedent in a peculiar, self-affirming manner. The dissent would say the court is
simply reading it wrong.
The great divide created here, right or wrong, has a powerful impact both on
online sales and on copyright enforcement. Given that his means of distribution
are overseas or otherwise judgment-proof, the pirate’s ability to profit in the Ninth
Circuit is, for now, untouchable.
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